Volume 12 (2016)

This paper extends Kitchen’s (1992) study on the determination of Canadian charitable giving by using an updated 2010 dataset. We have identified potential factors that could have affected the amount of monetary donations to religious, non-religious and all charities. We have found that a change in the price of giving or a change in the household size will significantly affect non-religious giving but not religious giving. It was also found that Atlantic Canadians contribute comparatively less in both religious and non-religious giving than the rest of the country.

From 2000 to 2005, online dating became a more viable option for mate selection and its usage boomed. The early adoption period of new technology (e.g., online dating) often is vital for new behavioral norms to spread, and it also provides an important historical context for examining how social groups respond differently to sudden changes in dating, marriage, and the family. This paper examines a specific social group that failed to adopt online dating during its early development: those who identify as very religious. Examining a nationally representative sample of Internet users who were single at some point from 2000 to 2005 (N=910), this study finds that those with high religious saliency were less likely to attempt online dating, despite its boom in popularity at the time. Mistrust of online dating websites partially explains this relationship, while religious attendance does not. This reflects a long history of very religious individuals resisting secular social changes to traditional patterns of dating, marriage, and the family. However, as religious individuals adapt and negotiate boundaries with secular culture over time, it is possible that online dating may become a more viable option for the very religious under certain conditions, which this article later discusses.

This article summarizes the first documented quantitative national estimates of the economic value of religion to U.S. society. Specifically, the study provides conservative, mid-range, and high estimates. The study’s most conservative estimate, which takes into account only the revenues of faith-based organizations, is $378 billion annually – or more than a third of a trillion dollars. By way of economic perspective, this is more than the global annual revenues of tech giants Apple and Microsoft combined. While this first estimate has the most concrete data, we believe that it is certainly an undervaluation because it focuses on annual revenues rather than on the fair market value of the goods and services religious organizations provide. Our second mid-range estimate attempts to correct for this in two ways: by providing an estimate of the fair market value of goods and services provided by religious organizations, and by including the contribution of businesses with religious roots. This mid-range estimate puts the value of religion to U.S. society at over $1 trillion annually. Our third, higher-end estimate recognizes that people of faith conduct their affairs to some extent (however imperfectly) inspired and guided by their faith ideals. This higher-end estimate is based on the household incomes of religiously affiliated Americans, and places the value of faith to U.S. society at $4.8 trillion annually, or the equivalent of nearly a third of America’s gross domestic product (GDP). Finally, we discuss the limitations of this study and suggest several possible lines of research that could build upon and extend this research.

This article focuses on the intricate and close relationship between religion and technology. It examines the use of religious applications (often referred to as “apps”) for smartphones and tablets. Apps are computer programs that are either free or available for purchase from places like the Apple iTunes store. Smartphones and tablets are easy and convenient ways to access information on the Internet and to connect to other users around the world. Religion has not been excluded from the coming of these new types of technology. There are hundreds of religious apps focused different faiths available. This article recounts the experiences of Christian and Muslim university students living near Washington, D.C. who self-report using religious apps on a regular basis. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews between 2014 and 2016. Using their experiences, we argue that religious apps are changing how religious authority is defined and are altering who is considered to be a religious leader according to our participants. We suggest that because of the portability of smartphones and tablets, the nature of religion has shifted from being located primarily in the public (i.e., institutions) to the more private spaces of their everyday lives. Moreover, given our sample, we also try to show how these students make sense of religions in a neoliberal age of media.

This study combines the growing field of social network analysis with religious history and biblical studies in order to examine Jesus’ social network. Using social network analysis allows this study to understand and depict patterns of interactions, the social structure, and the social dynamics surrounding Jesus’ life and ministry. This study focuses on Jesus’ interactions with three categories of people - his family and followers, the civil and religious authorities, and stigmatized people. Data were coded from the interactions recorded in the Gospels of the New Testament, and social network analyses describe Jesus’ network, examine patterns of positive and negative ties, and identify central figures. Based on the results, this study argues that: (1) Jesus’ interactions with his family and fol- lowers were characterized by support; (2) his interactions with the civil and religious authorities were characterized by conflict; (3) his interactions with stigmatized people were characterized by compassion.

This study is an inquiry into the nature of the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş -IGMG) movement in Germany. The movement has been identified as an “Islamist extremist group” by the German Ministry of the Interior in 2005. Germany has the highest number of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe and is home to Milli Görüş’s headquarters. We ask whether radicalization is a response to social, economic and political marginalization of Milli Görüş members in Germany. The data collected during the field research conducted in Germany between the years of 2004 and 2007 was used to explore radicalization process with a focus on marginalization.